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PRIVACY LAW-THE ROUTINE USE EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVACY ACT:
A CLARIFICATION ON COMPATIBILITY
Britt v. Naval Investigative Service (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress enacted a comprehensive piece of legislation
known as the Privacy Act (the Act) in an effort to restrict the ability of
government agencies to collect and maintain personal information on
individual citizens.' The operative portion of the Act places a general
prohibition upon the unauthorized release by government agencies of
personal information about an individual.2 The Act then allows for
twelve statutory exceptions to the general rule prohibiting unauthorized
disclosures. 3 One such exception is known as the "routine use" excep-
tion.4 The Act defines a "routine use" as "the use of [a] record for a
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was col-
lected."' 5 Before an agency may invoke the exception, it must have pre-
viously published a list of any such routine uses in the Federal Register.6
Practically, therefore, an agency seeking to justify an unauthorized dis-
closure under the routine use exception must meet the requirements of
compatibility of purposes and publication of routine uses.
In applying the compatibility requirement of the exception, most
courts use only a simple mechanical analysis of the relationship between
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). In the Senate Report on the Act, the intent
of Congress was stated as follows: "The purpose of [the Privacy Act] is to pro-
mote governmental respect for the privacy of citizens by requiring all depart-
ments and agencies of the executive branch and their employees to observe
certain constitutional rules in the computerization, collection, management, use,
and disclosure of personal information about individuals." S. REP. No. 1183,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6916,
6916.
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988). Section 552a(b) provides that "[n]o
agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any
means of communication to any person, or to another agency except pursuant to
a written request by, or with the prior consent of, the individual to whom the
record pertains." Id. Any disclosure made without the consent of the individual
would be considered an unauthorized disclosure.
3. See id. § 552a(b)(l)-(12).
4. See id. § 552a(b)(3). This exception permits an unauthorized disclosure
"for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described
under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section." Id.
5. Id. § 552a(a)(7).
6. See id. § 552a(b)(3) (requiring routine use to comply with description
under subsection (e)(4)(D) of the Act). Under subsection (e)(4)(D) of the Act,
an agency must publish "each routine use of the records contained in the sys-
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the disclosed information and the routine use published by the agency
in the Federal Register. 7 If the information disclosed fits within the de-
scription of the published routine use, then the disclosure is deemed
compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.8 On the other
hand, if the information does not fit within the routine use description,
then the disclosure is deemed incompatible. 9 Implicit in such an analy-
sis is the court's acceptance of the published routine use as the "purpose
for which [the information] was collected."
In Britt v. Naval Investigative Service,' 0 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit sought to clarify what it understood to be the requirement
of a more intricate process for determining compatibility under the rou-
tine use exception." t The court first held that the "purpose for which it
was collected" language of the Act 12 referred to the specific purpose for
which the information about the individual was collected and not to the
routine use purpose published in the Federal Register. 13 The court
then attempted to define the degree of compatibility required between
the purpose for disclosure and the purpose for which the information
was collected.' 4 The Third Circuit utilized a thorough dissection of the
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 841 F.2d 141, 145 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1988) (if routine use published in Federal Register, any information falling
within such use disclosable without consent); Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 86
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (disclosure not allowed because not related to routine use pub-
lished in Federal Register); United States v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 715 (10th Cir.
1981) (disclosure of information complied with published routine use in Federal
Register); Ely v. Department ofJustice, 610 F. Supp. 942, 945-46 (N.D. Ill. 1985)(court focused only on compliance with description of routine use published in
Federal Register), af'd, 792 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1986).
8. See, e.g., NLRB, 841 F.2d at 145 n.3. In analyzing the routine use excep-
tion, the court focused on the published routine use which stated that informa-
tion necessary for the postal workers' union to properly perform its collective
bargaining duties would be released. Id. The court then determined that infor-
mation indicating which postal employees were applying for management posi-
tions was necessary information for the union to have in performing its duties.
Id. at 145-46.
9. See, e.g., DiGenova, 779 F.2d at 86. In this case, the published routine use
stated that records which on their face indicated any criminal violation would be
released to the appropriate agency. Id. The information disclosed, however,
was medical information about the individual. Id. The court found no relation-
ship between records indicating criminal violations and records containing med-
ical information, thus the information released did not fit within the routine use
exception. Id.
10. 886 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1989).
11. For a discussion of the routine use exception and the compatibility re-
quirement, see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1988).
13. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 548-49. The court rejected the government's posi-
tion that a disclosure need only be compatible with a routine use purpose pub-
lished in the Federal Register, finding it "unaccountable" that the government
could misinterpret the "clear statutory language." Id. at 548.
14. Id. at 549-50. The court determined that mere relevance was not the
standard Congress intended under section 552a(a)(7). Id. For a further discus-
2
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routine use exception to reach its holdings.
II. DiscussION
Stephen Britt, the plaintiff in Britt v. Naval Investigative Service, was an
officer in the Marine Corps Reserves.' 5 Britt's problems began when
the home of one of his subordinate officers was searched by local and
federal authorities. 16 The search produced various items of military
ordnance, such as grenades and ammunition, and requisition forms
signed by Britt and his subordinate.' 7 The Naval Investigative Service
(NIS) made an initial determination that Britt was not authorized to req-
uisition the ordnance found and thereafter commenced an investigation
of Britt to determine if criminal prosecution was warranted. 18 The in-
vestigation did not lead to any charges, nor was any disciplinary action
taken against Britt.' 9 At the outset of the investigation, however, NIS
contacted Britt's employer, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), and disclosed the nature of the investigation and all the informa-
tion NIS had discovered up to that point. 20
The initial disclosure was made by the NIS agent because he "was
sure that the INS would want to have this information at the earliest
possible opportunity. ' '2 1 Britt's superior at INS then requested copies
of all the reports related to the investigation. 2 2 The request was ap-
proved and reports were sent to INS containing accounts of persons in-
terviewed, results of searches and a record of all physical evidence
seized. 23 The record of the trial court revealed no evidence that Britt
sion of the degree of relationship required by the Third Circuit, see infra notes
46-59 and accompanying text.
15. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 545.
16. Id. The home of Steven Reinert, a gunnery sergeant and subordinate of
Britt's, was searched by the Camden County (N.J.) Sheriffs Department and the
Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 546, 549. Britt alleged that NIS designated him for investigation
because Britt had testified at a bail proceeding on behalf of his subordinate Rei-
nert. See Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., No. 86-0889, 1-2 (E.D. Pa. July 10,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
19. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 546. In fact, Britt was subsequently promoted to
Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserves. Id.
20. Id. Britt was a special agent responsible for conducting administrative
and criminal investigations for the INS. Id. at 545. The disclosure was made to
his superior within the INS by the agent in charge of the investigation at NIS. Id.
at 546.
21. Id. at 549. It is crucial to this case that the initial disclosure was made
unilaterally by NIS. If INS had initiated the disclosure by formally requesting
the information, it is likely that there would have been no violation. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b)(7) (1988). The Act permits disclosure of information upon written
request by the head of another agency if the information requested is for use in
civil or criminal law enforcement activity. d.
22. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 546.
23. Id.
824 [Vol. 35: p. 822
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was under investigation by INS for the same or any other criminal activ-
ity, thus the only impetus for the request by INS was the initial disclo-
sure by NIS. 24 Shortly after the NIS investigation was concluded, Britt
brought suit against NIS for an unauthorized disclosure of personal in-
formation in violation of the Privacy Act.
25
NIS moved for summary judgment against Britt, and the motion
was granted by the district court.2 6 The district court ruled that the un-
authorized disclosure by NIS was covered by the routine use exception,
thus NIS was protected from any liability. 2 7 Britt appealed, contending
that NIS had failed to meet both the publication and compatibility re-
quirements of the routine use exception.2 8 Britt claimed that the pub-
lished routine use relied upon by NIS was vague and overbroad and thus
provided inadequate notice to individuals regarding what information
about them could be released and for what purposes it would be re-
leased.29 Alternatively, Britt contended that the purpose for which NIS
collected the information concerning him was not compatible with its
purpose for disclosing the information to INS. 30
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, basing its
holding on two findings: (1) the compatibility language used in the stat-
utory definition of "routine use" requires a higher standard than mere
relevance;3 1 and (2) an agency may not rely on a broad routine use pur-
pose published in the Federal Register in an effort to "evade the statu-
tory requirement that [the purpose for] disclosure must be compatible
with the [specific] purpose for which the material was collected."'3 2 The
24. Id. at 549.
25. Id. at 544. Britt also sought damages for violation of his due process
rights from the individual agents who conducted the investigation for NIS. That
claim was dismissed by the distct court and Britt did not appeal the dismissal.
Id. at 546.
26. Id. at 546.
27. Id. at 547. The district court also ruled that the disclosure fell within
the "need to know" exception to the Privacy Act. Id. The need to know excep-
tion covers disclosures within the same agency that must be made in order that
employees and officers within the agency may perform their duties. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b)(1) (1988). In Britt, however, the disclosure was made to the INS, not
the Marine Reserves, thus the Third Circuit held that the need to know excep-
tion was inapplicable. Britt, 886 F.2d at 547. This error of law was acknowl-
edged and conceded by the government in its brief, thus allowing the court to
bypass the issue quickly. Id.
28. For an explanation of the compatibility and publication requirements,
see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
29. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 547-48. For the text of the routine use relied on by
NIS and a discussion of its sufficiency, see infra notes 34-39 and accompanying
text.
30. See Bitt, 886 F.2d at 548.
31. Id. at 550. For a discussion of the court's rejection of the relevance
standard, see infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
32. Britt, 886 F.2d at 550. For a discussion of the court's analysis regarding
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case was remanded for further findings on the issue of damages.3 3
The court initially examined the compliance by NIS with the publi-
cation requirement.3 4 The government argued that the published rou-
tine use allowing disclosure by NIS to "federal regulatory agencies with
investigative units" satisfied its publication requirement.3 5 The court
pointed out that this phrase contained no statement of the purpose for
the use as required by section 552a(e)(4)(D) of the Act.3 6 Additionally,
in the opinion of the court, the phrase relied upon by NIS was too broad
to serve the functions of the publication requirement.3 7 The court de-
termined that the phrase lacked meaningful notice to individuals as to
what information would be released and the purposes for which it would
be released.38 The court also concluded that the breadth of the pub-
lished use left NIS free to make unauthorized disclosures of virtually any
information it possessed.3 9
33. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 551. The Privacy Act authorizes an individual to
bring a civil action against an agency for improper disclosures provided there is
an adverse effect on the individual. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(l)(D) (1988). Further-
more, damages are only recoverable if the agency acted intentionally or willfully.
Id. § 552a(g)(4). The court determined that Britt was denied satisfactory discov-
ery on the issue of intentional or willful violation of the Act and remanded to
allow for such discovery. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 551.
34. For the text of section 552a(e)(4)(D) (the publication requirement), see
supra note 6.
35. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 548. The text of the routine use relied upon by
NIS was as follows: "To other investigative units (federal, state or local) for
whom the investigation was conducted, or who are engaged in criminal investi-
gative and intelligence activities; federal regulatory agencies with investigative
units." Id. at 547 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 22,802-03 (1985)).
36. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 548. For the text of section 552a(e)(4)(D) (the
publication requirement), see supra note 6. The court concluded that the phrase
"[t]o other investigative units (federal, state or local) for whom the investigation
was conducted, or who are engaged in criminal investigative and intelligence
activities" gave adequate notice of the categories of users and the purpose. Id.
at 547-48. The court, however, contrasted that phrase with the "federal regula-
tory agencies with investigative units" phrase relied on by the government and
found the latter to be an independent phrase (the phrase was set off by a semico-
lon) that contained no purpose. Id. at 548.
37. Britt, 886 F.2d at 548. The court did not hold that the phrase relied
upon was too broad to satisfy the publication requirement because it chose to
rest its holding on the compatibility requirement. Id. Nonetheless, the dicta of
the court concerning the inadequacy of NIS's publication is strong and well sup-
ported by the legislative history. See id.
38. See id. at 548. The court stated that it "share[d] Britt's concern that the
breadth of the clause relied on does not provide adequate notice to individuals
as to what information concerning them will be released and the purposes of
such release." Id. The court looked to the legislative history of the Act to sup-
port its finding of congressional intent that the published routine use provide
meaningful notice. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6916, 6973).
39. Id. The court believed that any agency would have some type of investi-
gative unit and thus NIS could disclose the information to just about anyone. Id.
In the court's opinion, "[s]uch breadth fails to constrain in a meaningful manner
the NIS' discretion to disclose information." Id. The court noted that the intent
826 [Vol. 35: p. 822
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Despite its misgivings concerning the adequacy of the published
routine use relied upon by NIS, the court focused exclusively on the
compatibility requirement in reaching its holding.40 The definition of a
routine use disclosure states that the disclosure must be "for a purpose
which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected."'4 '
Within this phrase, the court articulated two definitions which it be-
lieved to be essential to proper application of the exception.
First, the court defined exactly which purposes must be compatible
for a routine use to exist. 42 According to the Third Circuit, the "pur-
pose for which the information was collected" referred to the purpose
for which the NIS collected the information about Britt in this specific
instance. 43 It did not, as NIS contended, refer to the general purposes
for collection of information by the agency which NIS had published
along with its routine uses in the Federal Register. 44 It is this "case-
specific purpose" that must be deemed compatible with the purpose for
the disclosure in order for the exception to be a valid justification. 4 5
Next, the Third Circuit focused on the word "compatible" to deter-
mine the degree of relationship required between the two purposes.4 6
The court concluded that NIS had made the disclosure because it
of Congress as shown in the legislative history was that the routine use excep-
tion " 'serve as a caution to agencies to think out in advance what uses it [sic]
will make of information.'" Id. (citing ANALYSIS OF HOUSE AND SENATE COMPRO-
MISE AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL PRIVACY ACT, reprinted in 120 CONG. REC.
40,405, 40,406 (1974)).
40. Id. at 548. The court explained that "[nlotwithstanding the problems
with the publication in the Federal Register, we [the Third Circuit] choose to
focus our attention, and rest our holding, on what we deem the more basic issue
[of compatibility]." Id.
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) (1988).
42. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 548-49. The court referred to the necessity of a
dual inquiry whereby each separate purpose is determined before any type of
relationship between the two is analyzed. Id.
43. Id. at 549. Upon review of the evidence (mainly affidavits of NIS offi-
cials) the court determined that NIS's investigation was for the specific purpose
of determining whether or not disciplinary action against Britt was appropriate.
Id. For an explanation of the facts surrounding the investigation, see supra notes
15-17 and accompanying text.
44. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 549. Along with the published list of routine uses,
NIS also published a description of the general purposes for which the agency
collected information. See 50 Fed. Reg. 22,802 (1985). The portion relied upon
by NIS included the following: "The records in this system are used to make
determinations of: suitability for access or continued access to classified infor-
mation, suitability for employment or assignment, suitability for access to mili-
tary installations ...." Id. NIS reasoned that the published purpose relating to
security clearance was consistent with the purpose for which it disclosed the in-
formation to INS. Britt, 886 F.2d at 549. The published purpose was, however,
not the purpose for which it investigated Britt. Id. Britt was investigated for a
specific instance of possible wrongdoing and not for a general security clear-
ance. Id.
45. Id. at 548-49.
46. Id. at 549-50.
1990] 827
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thought the information it had collected about Britt would be found
"relevant" by his superior at INS.4 7 A standard of mere relevance was
flatly rejected by the Third Circuit as not being sufficiently restrictive. 48
Instead, the court required "a more concrete relationship or similarity,
some meaningful degree of convergence, between the disclosing
agency's purpose in gathering the information and in its disclosure."'4 9
The lack of case law focusing on the compatibility aspect of the routine
use exception forced the Third Circuit to rely on dicta from other cir-
cuits 50 and language in the legislative history of the Privacy Act 5 ' in or-
der to determine the standard of compatibility. The court relied almost
exclusively on the legislative history of the Privacy Act to justify its inter-
pretation of the compatibility requirement.5 2 The court articulated the
general purpose of the Act as the protection of individual privacy from
government intrusion. 53 Then, more specifically, the Third Circuit ex-
amined the role of the compatibility requirement in furthering this gen-
eral purpose. 54 The report on the final bill described the requirement
as " 'intended to discourage the unnecessary exchange of information
... to agencies who may not be as sensitive to the collecting agency's
47. Id. at 549. NIS did not contend that it believed INS was conducting any
type of investigation of Britt, rather it only felt the information might have af-
fected Britt's ability to perform his job. Id. NIS believed that Britt's superior at
INS would want to have information suggesting a lack of integrity in one of his
subordinates who occupied a sensitive position within the agency. Id.
48. Id. The court noted that "[r]elevance ... is not the standard Congress
placed in section 552a(a)(7). Congress limited interagency disclosures to more
restrictive circumstances." Id.
49. Id. at 549-50. The court noted that the Privacy Act was drafted to pre-
vent agencies from "merely citing a notice of intended 'use' as [an] . . . easy
means ofjustifying transfer or release of information." Id. at 550 (citing S. REP.
No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6916, 6983).
50. Id. at 550. The court cited two cases in which the purposes for collec-
tion and the purposes for the disclosures were deemed incompatible, but these
findings did not control the outcome of the cases. See Covert v. Harrington, 876
F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (information collected pursuant to security clear-
ance investigation incompatible with disclosure for later criminal investigation
of individual); Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 713 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(information concerning dismissal of employee incompatible with disclosure to
prospective employer).
51. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 550.
52. Id. at 550.
53. Id. The court stated that "[o]ne of the goals of the Act was to prevent
the federal government from maintaining in one place so much information
about a person that [a] person could no longer maintain a realistic sense of pri-
vacy." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6916, 6930) ("[T]he creation of formal or de facto
national data banks, or of centralized Federal information systems without cer-
tain statutory guarantees would . . . threaten the observance of the values of
privacy and confidentiality in the administrative process.").
54. See id.
828 [Vol. 35: p. 822
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reasons for using and interpreting the material.' -55 The court con-
cluded that a standard based on mere relevance would weaken both the
general purpose of the Act and the specific purpose of the compatibility
requirement. 56
In applying its "more than relevance" or "meaningful degree of
convergence" standard, the Third Circuit held that the purpose of the
disclosure to INS 57 was not compatible with the purpose for which NIS
collected the information about Britt.58 In other words, a general dis-
closure to an employer regarding the integrity of an employee is not
sufficiently compatible with an investigation concerning a specific in-




The Britt decision clarifies the application of the compatibility re-
..quirement for existing government agencies in the Third Circuit and
elsewhere. 60 When contemplating an unauthorized disclosure based on
the routine use exception, an agency knows it must consider the specific
purpose for which it collected the information about the individual,
rather than a general purpose found in the Federal Register. 6 1 As seen
in Britt, the specific purpose will often diverge from the published gen-
eral purposes. 6 2 Additionally, an agency knows that its purpose for col-
lecting the information must have a particularly close connection to its
55. Id. (quoting Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Fed-
eral Privacy Act, reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. 40,405-06 (1974)).
56. Id. The court stated that "if the numerous government agencies which
collect information about individuals are free to share their information with
others, bound only by the standard of relevance to the recipient agency, the
purpose of the limitation in [section] 552a(a)(7) may be nullified." Id. The
court also noted the statement of Senator Percy (a cosponsor of the Act) that
" '[w]hen personal data collected by one organization for a stated purpose is
used and traded by another organization for a completely unrelated purpose,
individual rights could be seriously threatened.'" Id. (citing 120 CONG. REC.
36,894 (1974)).
57. For a discussion of the purpose of the disclosure to INS, see supra notes
44 and 47.
58. Britt, 886 F.2d at 550. The court "conclude[d] ... that NIS' use of the
information compiled as to Britt, which was merely a preliminary investigation
with no inculpatory findings, by disclosing it to Britt's civilian employer (albeit a
government agency) was not compatible with the purpose 'for which the infor-
mation was collected.' " Id. For a discussion of the purpose for NIS's collection
of information on Britt, see supra note 44.
59. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 549-50.
60. For a discussion of another circuit court's recent reliance on the Third
Circuit's holding in Britt, see infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of the proper analysis for comparing the purpose for
the collection of the information and the purpose for the disclosure, see supra
notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
62. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 550.
1990] 829
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purpose for disclosing it. 63 For instance, the Britt court made it a point
to dismiss the possibility that INS was investigating Britt for the same
activity.64 If INS had been investigating Britt for the same activity, then
the disclosure by NIS would have satisfied the court's standard. A
harder case would be presented by a situation where INS was investigat-
ing Britt for possible criminal conduct related to a different activity.
Although the court's definition of "more than relevance" is not emi-
nently clear,6 5 a disclosure of a criminal investigation by one agency to
another agency also conducting a criminal investigation of the same per-
son would likely be considered more than relevant. The standard does
not present a bright-line rule, but does provide some guidance by rais-
ing the acceptable standard for compatibility above mere relevance.
The Third Circuit's holding in Britt has recently been cited with ap-
proval and followed by the Ninth Circuit.6 6 In Swenson v. United States
Postal Service,67 the Ninth Circuit was faced with the case of a postal
worker who had written to her Congressmen to complain about miscon-
duct on the part of her postmaster. 68 The Congressmen wrote a letter
of inquiry to the Postal Service concerning Swenson's allegations about
her postmaster's misconduct. 6 9 The responses received by the Con-
gressmen contained personal information about Swenson's employment
status. 70 The court, citing the Third Circuit's "more than relevance"
test, found that the purpose for the disclosure by the Postal Service was
incompatible with the purpose for which it had collected the information
63. For a discussion of the degree of relationship required by the compati-
bility requirement, see supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
64. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 549.
65. For the court's definition of "more than relevance," see supra note 49
and accompanying text. On the facts of Britt, the court went so far as to hold
that the standard was more than relevance, yet it declined to go any further in
restricting the exception. See Britt, 886 F.2d at 549.
66. See Swenson v. United States Postal Serv., 890 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.
1989) (relying on Britt in holding there must be a "meaningful degree of conver-
gence" between purpose for collecting and purpose for disclosing information).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1076. Swenson was a rural route mail carrier in California. Id.
She observed that her postmaster deliberately undercounted rural route mail-
boxes, which entitled him to merit bonuses, and forced mail carriers to work off
the clock. Id. In her letter, Swenson alleged that the undercounting resulted in
lost revenue for the government, non-delivery of mail to boxholders at the end
of the route and reduction in advertiser access to postal patrons. Id. Swenson
also contended that when she attempted to correct the problem, she was
threatened and harassed. Id.
69. Id. Both Representative Chappie and Senator Wilson of California
wrote to the United States Postal Service in an effort to uncover information
concerning Swenson's allegations. Id.
70. Id. The letters to the Congressmen revealed that Swenson had filed sex
discrimination complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). Id. at 1077. One letter also disclosed that Swenson had filed two
grievances in response to warnings from her employer. Id. at 1076-77.
[Vol. 35: p. 822830
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about Swenson. 7 1 The Ninth Circuit's adherence to the Third Circuit's
holding indicates that the standard set forth by the Third Circuit is prac-
tical despite being somewhat vague. A "more than relevance" standard
allows for considerable judicial discretion whereby the courts have am-
ple room to effectuate the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act. 72 At
the same time, the standard provides a cognizable warning to govern-
ment agencies that they will be bound by a higher standard than mere
relevance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's interpretation of the routine use exception is
consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the Privacy Act. The
acceptance of a relevance standard by the Britt court would have eviscer-
ated the usefulness of the Act. An agency would then merely have to
demonstrate that it reasonably believed the information would in some
way be relevant to the agency to which it was disclosed. Such a subjec-
tive standard would not lessen the unnecessary exchange of information
between agencies, rather, it would increase it dramatically. Congress
sought to preserve individual privacy rights by restricting the unauthor-
ized disclosure power of agencies to the bare minimum required for the
smooth operation of modem government. 73 In structuring the Act,
Congress was careful to define the acceptable situations where unau-
thorized disclosures would be permitted.7" The Third Circuit kept the
routine use exception from expanding in scope to the point of minimiz-
ing the utility of the other narrowly defined exceptions provided by
Congress.
Christopher W, Wasson
71. Id. at 1078. The court determined that the Postal Service collected the
information regarding Swenson's EEOC complaints to evaluate the effectiveness
of the EEOC program, and the information on the other grievances was col-
lected for routine personnel functions. Id. Implicit in the court's analysis was its
recognition that the appropriate purpose to be compared with the purpose of
the disclosure was the specific purpose for which the information was collected
on Swenson. In this respect also, the Ninth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's
holding in Britt. For a discussion of the case-specific purpose requirement out-
lined by the Third Circuit in Britt, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
72. For a discussion of the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act and the
compatibility, requirement, see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
73. For a statement of Congress's concern for individual privacy, see supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
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